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Abstract 
 The area of the Gulf is synonymous not onlyto the huge amount of 
resources but also to the fact that it resembles to the setting of inexorable 
disputes and fights. The disputes in the Gulf emanate from various reasons, 
namely religious, factious, national and racial. Undoubtedly, disputes over 
sovereignty, boarders and resources have human, economic, environmental 
and cultural cost. It may be suggested that the evolution and the continuity of 
such disputes in the region mainly consists an effect of a perpetual quest for 
power and resources. Iran consists one of the fundamental powers in the 
region, which attempts to establish its terms and status quo. At the same time 
the Caspian Sea tends to provide rich resources to Iran as well. However, are 
these resources enough to render Iran regional hegemony? The present study 
examines this scenario in light of the newly adopted Convention on the legal 
status of the Caspian Sea between the five littoral states. 
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Introduction 
The location of the Middle East joining the Old World’s three continents is 
deemed to be of utmost importance in terms of its vast reserves and its transit 
ways (Cohen, 2015). Furthermore, the region of the Middle East is enclosed 
by major water bodies, namely the Caspian, eastern Mediterranean, Red Sea 
and Persian- Arabic Gulf. In light of this event, this particular region has been 
the bone of contention for Great Powers, who sought to establish their status 
quo.  
 The disputes in the Gulf emanate from various reasons, namely 
religious, factious, national and racial. Undoubtedly, disputes over 
sovereignty, boarders and resources have human, economic, environmental 
and cultural cost. It may be suggested that the evolution and the continuity of 
such disputes in the region mainly consist an effect of a perpetual quest for 
7th Mediterranean Interdisciplinary Forum on Social Sciences and Humanities, 
MIFS 2019, 16-17 May, Barcelona, Spain, Proceedings 
126 
power and resources. However, it goes without saying that the region of the 
Persian- Arabian Gulf constitutes one of the most prominent and major 
sources of crude oil on a global scale, which means that energy politics and 
strategy- establishment tend to consist the cornerstone of disputes. Typical 
instance of the aforementioned vast oil reserves consists the field of Al- 
Safaniya, which is the biggest offshore field with 35 billion barrels of 
remaining reserves (EIA, 2017). To be more specific, the Persian Arabic Gulf 
is characterized by heavy concentration of crude oil reserves, estimated to 50% 
of the world’s oil reserves (OPEC, 2016).  
 The history, the extent and the ambition of Iran in the Gulf and the 
rivalries with neighboring countries appointed it the center of numerous 
unsolved disputes (with Iraq andUnited Arab Emirates) for islands, adjoining 
water and sovereignty. Tension between Iran and the rest of the Arab world is 
also projected on the name of the Gulf. Regarding maritime delimitations in 
the area, it is important to mention that the peculiar morphology of the Persian- 
Arabian Gulf entails in the whole seabed and subsoil’s appertaining to 
international jurisdiction while the need of delimitation of maritime zone is 
obvious. However, two special circumstances should be taken into 
consideration during the process of maritime delimitation; the great number of 
islands and the enormous amounts of oil reserves.  
 Regarding Iran’s oil reserves and exports, it is worth mentioning the 
fact that Iran had an estimated 157 billion barrels of proved crude oil reserves, 
representing almost 10% of the world’s crude oil reserves and about 13% of 
reserves held by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) (EIA, 2019). Furthermore, Iran holds the second position- after 
Russia- of largest proved reserves of natural gas (EIA, 2019). The majority of 
Iran’s reserves tend to lie onshore with the Khuzestan Basin (North Persian 
Gulf) containing almost 80% of the onshore reserves (EIA, 2019).  
 It is worth mentioning the fact that despite the efforts having been 
made, little have been achieved in the utilisation of renewable energy sources 
in Iran. To be more specific, although it is urged Iran use alternative energy 
resources for the sake not only of its economic development but also as a 
means to minimize the environmental impact of the use of fossil fuel, the 
legislative gap has led to minor use of eco-friendly resources. However, it is 
of utmost importance to briefly mention a core part of Iran’s renewable energy 
sources. Solar power consists one of the most prominent renewable resource 
for energy, on the grounds that it is covered in deserts and it is characterized 
by high solar radiation (Khojasteh, Khojasteh, Kamali, Beyene, Iglesias, 
2017). What should be stressed is that Greater Tunb Island- the bone of 
contention as analysed in the section below- has demostrated great potential 
for utilisation of tidal energy(Radfar, Panahi, Javaherchi, Filom,Mazyaki, 
2017) 
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 At the same time, the existence of numerous islands in the Gulf as well 
as their significance due to oil reserves demonstrates the need for a brief 
analysis of the International Law of the Sea in the area. Typical instance is 
Abu Musa island located between Iran and United Arab Emirates (Emirate 
Sharjah, Umm- Al- Qaywayn and Dubai) as its territorial water is rich in 
recourses.  
 According to the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea 
1982 (henceforth UNCLOS 1982), islands are entitled to territorial sea, 
continental shelf and exclusive economic zone. Territorial sea is a term used 
to describe a belt of sea adjacent to a coastal or archipelagic state where the 
sovereignty of the coastal or archipelagic state is extended. Each state is 
entitled to establishing the breadth of its territorial sea (extended to the air 
space over it and to its bed and subsoil as well) up to 12 nautical miles 
measured from baselines (UNCLOS, 1982). Additionally, under UNCLOS 
1982 the continental shelf of a coastal state consists of the seabed and the 
subsoil of the submarine areas beyond its territorial sea to a distance of 200 
nautical miles. In the particular maritime zone, the coastal state exercises 
exclusively sovereign rights for purpose of exploring and exploitation of 
natural resources (UNCLOS, 1982). Finally, according to Article 57 of 
UNCLOS 1982, Exclusive Economic Zone (hereinafter EEZ) can extend up 
to 200 nautical miles from the baselines. EEZ is a sui generis maritime zone 
where the coastal state exercises sovereign rights, namely exploring and 
exploiting natural resources, over waters, seabed and subsoil. At the same 
time, other states, both coastal and land- locked enjoy the freedom of 
navigation, overflight and laying cables and pipelines as established in 
Articles 58 and 87 of UNCLOS 1982 (UNCLOS, 1982).  
 
The Main Dispute 
 The dispute between United Arabian Emirates (henceforth UAE) and 
Iran concerning sovereignty over Abu Musa and Greater and Lessen Tunbs 
dates back in 1971. Abu Musa Island (measures 12,8 km2 and inhabited by 
approximately 2000 inhabitants) is located on the east part of Persian- Arabian 
Gulf, on the mouth of the strait of Hormuz. Abu Musa and Tunbs Islands (only 
Greater Tunb is inhabited by 350 residents) are of great geopolitical 
importance due to the fact that their seabed and subsoil are rich in natural 
resources (Rubin, 2002). Iran claims that the word “Tunbs” is of Iranian 
linguistic origin and means “hill”. On the contrary, the UAE tend to advocate 
that the word is purely Arabic and means “long rope being used for assembling 
a tent”. In addition, their strategic location is of great geopolitical importance 
on the grounds that that they are in control of energy, environmental, 
commercial and shipping activity not only in regional but also in global level 
as well.  
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 The springboard to the dispute between the UAE and Iran over Abu 
Musa Island and Tunbs Island was 1971 (Al- Nayhan, 2013). In 1968 Great 
Britain announced the end of its administrative and military presence in the 
region of Persian- Arabian Gulf. Consequently, the administration of Abu 
Musa Island was assigned to Sharjah (one of the seven sheikdoms that later 
constituted the United Arab Emirates). However, Tehran stated that Iran is 
historically entitled to the Persian Gulf, while sovereignty over the under- 
dispute islands were given to the Arabs during 19th century (Ahmadi, 2008).  
 After Great Britain had resigned from the Persian- Arabian Gulf in 
1971, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between Iran and 
Sherjah sheihdom, according to which Sherjah would retain sovereignty over 
Abu Musa island, while Iran was entitled to establish military troops on the 
island (Ahmadi, 2008). Furthermore, according to the aforementioned MoU, 
oil deposits and natural resources surrounding Abu Musa island would be 
allocated. After Iranian military force’s establishment on Abu Musa island, 
Iran occupied Tunbs island, which entailed in triggering a new sequence of 
reaction in the Arab world. In 1980 (a few years after United Arab Emirates 
were constituted) United Arab Emirates appealed to United Nations and 
simultaneously collaborated with five states of Persian- Arabian Gulf (Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman) founding Gulf Cooperation 
Council- GCC.Events of 1992 were determining for the region of Persian- 
Arabian Gulf as a new strategy against Iran was established by not only United 
Arab Emirates but also by moderate conservatives. The particular strategy 
focused on Abu Musa island, while it extended to Greater and Lesser Tunbs 
later, due to which the dispute was intensified. The peak of intensity was the 
Abu Musa occupation by Iran and at the same time the expulsion of island’s 
Arab population (Ahmadi, 2008). This action suggests an Iranian attempt for 
the island to be entirely inhabited by Iranian population so that it could be 
incorporated in the corpus of Iran and consequently be under Iran governance. 
It can be assumed that this circle of actions and reactions having taken place 
in 1992 consists a byproduct of new tendencies in the region (Askari, 2013, 
p.94) as well as the deterioration of relations between Iran and states of Gulf 
Cooperation Council (Ahmadi, 2008). Thus, the dispute over Abu Musa island 
was both a product and means of promoting a strategy aiming at confining and 
isolating Iran. Bilateral relationships had already suffered were it to be taken 
into consideration that Arab nations did not recognize the diplomatic approach 
of Iran (Ahmadi, 2008). 
 The Mubarak oilfield located six miles off Abu Musa island is claimed 
to be “an inseparable part of Iran” (Rahnema & Behdad, 1996) and it was a 
fundamental reason for Iran’s extending its continental shelf up to 12 nautical 
miles (Act on the Marine Areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Persian 
Gulf and the Oman Sea, 1993). The particular expansion is of paramount 
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importance should be taken into account the size and the proximity in the 
Persian- Arabian Gulf.  
 On the contrary, United Arab Emirates, whose economy is based upon 
oil (UAE Economic Report, 2015), attempt to gain as many as possible 
oilfields. Despite the remaining dispute, neither the United Arab Nations nor 
Gulf Cooperation council have planned to escalate the dispute. The major 
reason of choosing this particular policy is the border dispute between United 
Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.  
 Overall, Iran has recognized the significance of the three islands in the 
region of the Persian- Arab Gulf. The islands dominate in the mouth of the 
Gulf and it seems that control and sovereignty over the islands is the key to 
regional security and domination in the particular area. 
 
The Caspian Basin 
 The Caspian basin, despite the fact that its legal status has not been 
established yet as to whether it is a sea or a lake, is one of the most important 
and significant regions of the world. The reason? The vast amount of 
hydrocarbons deposits that lie along both the coastline and inland and they can 
be used as an alternative source to meet the global energy shortage.  
 Specifically, the Caspian basin consists an enclosed or inland body of 
water, which is located in the northwest Asia and is surrounded by five littoral 
states; Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. According to 
the estimations of the US Energy Information Administration (henceforth 
EIA) there are 48 billion barrels of oil and 292 trillion cubic feet (henceforth 
Tcf) of natural gas in proven and probable reserves in the Caspian region (EIA, 
2013). Additionally, according to the estimations of the Iranian company 
“Petroleum Iran” the region of Caspian holds 17-33 billion barrels of proven 
oil reserves and about another 233 billion barrels of probable oil. Moreover, 
according to the estimations of the aforementioned company, it holds 177-182 
Tcf of proven natural gas deposits and 293 Tcf of unproven natural gas 
reserves (Petroleum Iran, 2019). The difference in estimations lies on the 
ground that its legal status has not been determined yet and each of the littoral 
states tend to claim the “lion’s share” of the deposits.  
 Until the beginning of the 20th century, the Caspian basin 
was identified as a lake and was controlled only by two littorals states, namely 
Iran and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (henceforth USSR). Their 
relations were regulated by two treaties; the first one was the “Treaty of 
Friendship between Persia and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet 
Republic”, which had been signed in 1921, recognizing equal rights for both 
parties in the Caspian basin, as long as the right of free navigation was under 
their flag, while the second one was the “Treaty of Commerce and 
Navigation”, which was signed in 1940, reaffirming the same rights (Treaty 
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of Friendship between Persia and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet 
Republic, 1921: Article 11 & Pawletta, 2007 & Bahgat, 2007& Koutsouradi, 
Karkazis, Siousiouras & Chondrogianni, 2018). The situation changed 
drastically in the beginning of 1990s when the USSR was dissolved and the 
new independent states (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan) claimed 
more space in the region and asserted equal rights and participation in the oil 
and gas deposits. The last ones belonged to the category of the “land-locked” 
states (UNCLOS, 1982) and the access to the high seas was of vital importance 
to them. As a result, they were in favor of its proclamation as a sea and wanted 
to be enforced the 1982 Convention in order to ensure their rights in the 
region(Koutsouradi, Karkazis, Siousiouras& Chondrogianni,2018). 
 After twenty years of lasting and active conflicts and turmoil in the 
region, the solution to this situation seems to be the newly adopted Convention 
on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea (henceforth the Convention), which 
had been signed on 12th August 2018 by the five littoral states and according 
to the Russian President, Vladimir Putting, “it replaced the aforementioned 
treaties of 1921 and 1940” (BBC, 2018 & Putin, 2018). 
 The Convention tries to establish a stable, secured and peaceful 
environment for the littoral states, by eliminating the hostilities of the past and 
by prohibiting the presence of third parties’ armed forces. In order to achieve 
these, it is pointed out that each country in the region could claim a territorial 
zone, which cannot be extended more than 15 nautical miles (henceforth nm). 
The delimitation of the maritime zone between states with adjacent coasts 
shall be determined in accordance with the rules of international law 
(Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, 2018: Article 7). 
Moreover, the states shall delimit the seabed and subsoil into sectors by mutual 
agreements, which should be made between their adjacent and opposite states. 
In its sector, every state shall exercise exclusive sovereign rights and the rest 
of the countries can not interfere in its sector (Convention on the Legal Status 
of the Caspian Sea, 2018: Article 8). 
 Additionally, the neighboring states could have the opportunity to 
delimit a fishery zone until 10 nm, in which every coastal state shall hold 
an exclusive right to harvest aquatic biological resources (Convention on the 
Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, 2018: Article 9). The remaining the sea is 
called “common maritime sea” and is free and open for all the surrounding 
countries. In this area every littoral state shall enjoy the freedom of navigation, 
the freedom of transit and the freedom of access to the oceans (Convention on 
the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, 2018: Article 10). 
 As it is concluded from the above analysis, the Convention divides the 
Caspian’s water into three zones; the territorial waters, the fishery zone and 
“the common maritime space”, which operates as the high seas.  
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The Outcome of the Convention 
 The Caspian Sea is of vital importance to the littoral states and each of 
its “players” knows it. Although the Convention does not define the Caspian 
basin as a sea or a lakeand it has not entered in force yet1, its “special legal 
status” may be a positive step towards settling this long-lasting dispute for all 
the surrounding states. Moreover, it can be advocated that the aforementioned 
Convention is a milestone and establishes a “sui generis” regime for the 
Caspian basin, which may lead to a positive outcome for the stability and the 
good – neighborly relations among the states not only in the region, but at a 
global scale as well.  
 It is a fact that by signing the Convention the parties accept that they 
have the same rights and duties, enjoy the freedom of navigation and 
reassuretheir access to the oceans regardless of whether it is a coastal state or 
a land-locked one. This prospect seems to be favorable for all the participants 
and especially to Iran for multiplereasons. First of all, the prohibition of any 
armed presence in the region of a third country, which does not belong to the 
Caspian basin, means that Iran is protected from the absence of the USA and 
their allies. Second of all, although Iran has the least oil and gas reserves in 
the region, it could use the Caspian basin as one of its diversified energy 
sources, in order to confirm its reputation as one of the major oils and gas 
producers in the world. Thirdly, by the adoption of the Convention it is 
probably that new, foreign companies will be willing to invest in the region, 
in order to construct new pipelines and new projects. This is a very positive 
prospect, because the economy of the country will flourish. Last but not least, 
Iran’s position and role in the region is being upgraded by the fact that without 
its acquiescence the rest of the countries cannot exploit the available deposits.  
 
Conclusion  
 The Persian – Arabic Gulf is one of the most important regions of the 
word, due to its location and to the vast amount of the deposits it holds. It is a 
fact that controlling the aforementioned sea could easily increase the power of 
every littoral state and Iran not only knows that, but it wants to be the 
protagonist in the region as well. The Persian – Arabic Gulf could function as 
the pivotal space for Iran, which in combination with the Caspian basin could 
maximize Iran’s power, increase its protection and its space to the point of 
becoming the only regional superpower. Thus, this particular region could 
provide Iran with more hydrocarbon’s deposits, namely oil and natural gas, 
and as a result it would become one of the world’s largest suppliers. Moreover, 
the control of the aforementioned Gulf will upgrade Iran’s position on the 
world map and strengthen its “profile” in the region, while the New 
                                                             
1It will enter into force, when all the signatories ratify it. 
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Convention in the Caspian Sea tend to be an integral part of Iran’s upgrading. 
However, in order this prospect to be achievable, Iran should solve its regional 
active disputes and settle down its conflicts in accordance with the 
international law, international rules, and to its commitments to its 
neighboring states. 
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